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The surge in FDI over the past three decades has been accompanied by a surge in bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). The latter could be seen as a reaction to the former—or its cause, due 
to the protections that BITs offer to foreign investors. The rise in BITs has also caused a surge  in 
the scholarly literature investigating their impact on FDI flows, which still provides mixed 
findings.1 Yet, the literature has neglected the case of Brazil, a country that has attracted increased 
FDI flows despite not ratifying any BIT. Consequently, Brazil has been used as an example that 
BITs do not have any effects on FDI inflows and, hence, that countries can do without them. 
 
Even though Latin American countries were reticent to negotiate BITs, influenced by the Calvo 
doctrine’s underlying belief that foreign investors should receive the same treatment as domestic 
investors, all countries in the region eventually ratified multiple BITs. Brazil signed fourteen BITs 
in the early 1990s, yet the Brazilian Congress never ratified them. The opposition feared that most-
favored-nation provisions jeopardize Brazil’s sovereignty by offering preferred terms to foreign 
investors and, most importantly, that investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) was incompatible 
with the constitution. Brazilian officials argued at the time that the inexistence of BITs had not 
affected the country’s position as an important FDI destination. Brazil’s stable domestic legal 
regime and the strength of Brazil’s economy were arguably the reasons why. In the absence of a 
clear negative impact on FDI inflows, Brazil did not seem to have the crucial pressure other 
countries had when considering entering into BITs. Brazil became the example that a major host 
country does not need BITs to attract FDI if it has a strong economy and proper domestic 
protections for foreign investors. 
 
2 
Analyzing Brazil’s BITs position on FDI inflows meets with the obstacle that there are no two 
countries that resemble each other in all factors that impact FDI inflows. The synthetic control 
method allows construction of a hypothetical version of Brazil as a weighted average of the 
available control units, consequently enabling a better comparative analysis. 2  The factors 
considered in this analysis are the main covariates used in the literature,3 the strength of domestic 
institutions and the level of property-rights protection. The donor pool, i.e., the countries from 
which the weights are selected, is comprised of all developing countries that have received FDI 
before 1990 and enacted BITs after 1990. The synthetic Brazil is constructed then as the convex 
combination of countries in the donor pool that most closely resemble pre-1990 Brazil considering 
20 years pre- and post-periods.    
 
Importantly, this counterfactual analysis shows that Brazil would have received additional FDI 
inflows had it enacted BITs, i.e., it had not achieved its full potential in terms of attractiveness. 
This suggests that not all foreign investors were willing to trust Brazil’s institutions, but if the 
economic determinants are right, some investors were willing to take the risk. One would need to 
weigh the “benefit” of that additional FDI against the related risk in terms of increased exposure 
to ISDS. 
 
The fact that Brazil, an increasingly important home country, is now pursuing its own brand of 
BITs (Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreements) is an interesting change in direction. 
Brazil, which was swimming against the tide before by resisting the enactment of BITs, is 
swimming against the tide again as its BITs advocacy comes at a time when a number of countries 
are abrogating such treaties. Brazil is still not a member of ICSID, and its BIT model neither 
follows its rules nor provides for ISDS. These abrogating countries are now accepting Brazil’s 
initial position that potential increases in FDI are not worth exposure to ISDS.4 Yet, the fact that 
these countries are not necessarily rejecting BITs completely, coupled with the results of the 
counterfactual analysis and Brazil’s late push toward investment treaties, reveal the importance to 
FDI inflows of protecting the property rights of foreign investors. Thus, policy-makers frustrated 
with the system should be careful when abrogating BITs if they want to continue attracting a 
maximum of foreign capital. They can pressure ICSID for change and reform the system,5 but they 
should not underestimate the  importance of investor protection. Or they can imitate Brazil and 
pursue alternatives.  
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